rifleman_sa обращает внимание:
СNN : ГЛАВНАЯ ОШИБКА ГРУЗИИ
Одна из последних статей на CNN.com по теме Российско-Грузинского конфликта
вышла под названием — "Главная ошибка Грузии?".Статья достаточно жестко
говорит о том, что никакой реальной поддержки от Запада, и в частности от ЕС
Саакашвили не получит.Более того, сам тон по отношению к Мишико весьма
уничижителен. Статью пересказывать не буду- рекомендую прочесть.
Более того в ней напрямую указывается возможность размена Грузии на Иран.
Соответственно из этого можно сделать вывод, что удар по Ирану — неизбежен.
Что собственно косвенно подтверждается беспрецендентной по мощи авианосной
группировкой нато, направляющейся в Персидский залив
Третья мировая война стала еще ближе.



Analysis: Georgia's major miscalculation?


European leaders feel a special responsibility for preventing further
escalation
CNN's Robin Oakley says Georgia's leader may have misjudged Europe's
response
Oakley says EU nations now have "Georgia fatigue" that could affect NATO bid
By CNN's European Political Editor Robin Oakley

(CNN) -- There has been no doubt of Europe's priority in the conflict
between Georgia and Russia: Bringing about a ceasefire on both sides and
minimizing further bloodshed. Beyond that, nothing in this conflict is
simple.

European leaders feel a special responsibility for preventing further
escalation and several of them have condemned a "disproportionate" use of
force by Russia. The European Commission has called for an end to all
Russian military activity on Georgian soil.

But at the same time European diplomats accept that Mikheil Saakashvili
initiated military action in seeking to reassert Georgian control of its
breakaway province of South Ossetia, perhaps hoping that he could
consolidate power there while the world was preoccupied with the Olympics.

At the time of the Rose Revolution in 2003, European lawmakers saw
Saakashvili through similarly tinted spectacles, but nowadays they regard
him as a somewhat headstrong figure who had already damaged his credentials
as a democrat by the way in which he suppressed dissent in his country last
November.

Georgia may claim that South Ossetia's leaders are controlled by the
Russia's FSB security service but Europeans sense Saakashvili gave Russia
the excuse it was looking for to intervene, insisting that its own
"peace-keepers" in South Ossetia were under threat and had to be protected.

If Saakashvili thought that the Europeans in particular and the Western
world in general would rally to his cause, he miscalculated. European
diplomats have for a while been confessing a degree of "Georgia fatigue."

That was why several of the Europeans banded together at the NATO summit in
Bucharest in March to frustrate U.S. President George W. Bush's demand that
Georgia should be set on the first step there towards NATO membership.

It is unlikely now that when NATO's foreign ministers meet in December to
look again at the question of Georgia and Ukraine being invited to join
NATO's Membership Action Program they will be handing out any gilt-edged
cards.

Saakashvili insists that the Russia action is "premeditated aggression." But
European leaders do not echo his rhetoric when he goes on to claim that "If
the whole world does not stop Russia today then Russian tanks will be able
to reach any other European capital."

Whatever the provocations, they do not thank him for turning the "frozen
conflict" over South Ossetia and its other breakaway region Abkhazia into a
real one.

Most European leaders are in a phase of working to improve relations with
Russia, not least because the EU countries are dependent on Russia now for
nearly 40 percent of their energy supplies.

They know that the Russian leadership has not taken kindly to their lectures
on democracy and they are acutely aware of how irritated Russia was by most
of the Europeans and the West backing the declaration of independence from
Serbia declared by Kosovo. They also need to keep Russia on side in much
bigger strategic questions like Iran's nuclear program.

In diplomacy the "many-sidedness of truth" is often apparent.

Those sympathetic to Georgia can point out the hypocrisy of Russia brutally
suppressing separatism in Chechnya while fostering it in South Ossetia and
Abkhazia. But others recall the parallels the Russians continually
emphasized over Kosovo with the breakaway regions of the Georgian state that
have enjoyed de facto independence since the early 1990s.

Where the Europeans will draw the line is if Russia continues to violate the
statehood and sovereignty of Georgia.

We have already seen sharp exchanges at the UN between U.S. and Russian
representatives, with Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S. envoy, warning that "The
days of overthrowing leaders by military means in Europe is over" and
Europeans will certainly resist any Moscow-induced attempt to have the
democratically elected Saakashvili removed by anything other than the
actions of Georgian voters.

What Saakashvili has perhaps neglected is the bitterness the current Russia
leadership feels not only over Kosovo but over the development of the US
missile defence scheme in Europe, with installations planned in Poland and
the Czech Republic, and over the steady expansion to the east both of NATO
and the European Union.

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and his protege Dmitry Medvedev still
smart for the humiliations suffered by the former Soviet Union during the
Boris Yeltsin years. They remain firm believers in a Russian sphere of
influence in which NATO and others meddle at their peril.

NATO's Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer may condemn Russia for a
"disproportionate use of force," echoed by Russia's traditional critics
within the EU like Poland and the Baltic states.
But when it comes to anything more than supportive words, Georgia is likely
to be disappointed by the European reaction. It is likely to look in vain to
Brussels for practical or military help in regaining control of its
separatist regions.